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11 Introduction
Voting games are often played sequentially. It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd examples in real life. The
most evident case is probably the presidential election mechanism in the USA: the candidates
are locally chosen through primaries and each local primary is set up on a diﬀerent date.
Another example is given by committees. Members often announce their vote, or opinion, in
sequence. For instance, in U.S. Navy courts-martial, judges vote in a particular order, leaving
the highest ranked ones at the end. In Italy, when expressing on particular topics, courts are
composed by three members and, according to the code of penal procedure (art. 527), votes
are gathered starting from the opinions of the less experienced members (seniority rule).
More speciﬁcally, this paper has been motivated by the observation of an important Ital-
ian institution, the “Corte Costituzionale” (Constitutional Court). One of the tasks of this
court is to solve questions about the constitutionality of national and regional laws. This
duty obviously requires a strong independence from, for instance, the parliament, which ac-
tually passes new laws. The ﬁfteen members of this Court are appointed by three diﬀerent
institutional bodies (the president of the Republic, the parliament and high judges). It is fair
to assume that members chosen by the parliament might be aﬀected by political bias. We
therefore question the rationale of this apparently ineﬃcient choice, for an institution which
is supposed to pursue social welfare1.
We analyze a simultaneous and a sequential voting game where three members of a com-
mittee have diﬀerent preferences. We show that, in the latter game, the order of voting is
relevant and that optimality can be guaranteed. More surprisingly, it is the presence itself
of a biased member which allows for uniqueness of the optimal equilibrium. The intuition
for this result is that the bias provides certainty about the voter’s strategy and removes an
important (and ineﬃcient) piece of uncertainty from the model.
To do this, we ﬁrst explore a series of simpler voting games. They diﬀer along several
dimensions. First of all, we consider sequential and simultaneous voting games of players with
truth purpose. Each member has private information, namely a correct signal about the true
state of the world, and wants to maximize the expected (common) value of the election. Then,
we change the players preferences and analyse what happens to their equilibrium strategies
when they only want to maximize their own probability of being right (reputational purpose).
Finally, we introduce heterogeneity and we study the voting behavior of a committee with
three kinds of players.
From a theoretical point of view, the paper provides insights about the most eﬃcient
u s eo fs c a r c ei n f o r m a t i o n . O n es i d eo ft h ep r o b l e mi st h a to n em e m b e r( t h eb i a s e do n e )
ﬁnd it optimal to destroy his information. Surprisingly, this choice provides uniqueness and
optimality (given that a certain order of voting is imposed). Another side of the problem is
about the behaviour of uninformed members when they are forced to vote (e.g., they are not
allowed to abstain). They face (and solve) the dilemma of wrongly inﬂuencing the outcome
1Historical and political reasons are also provided (see section 5).
2of an election.
The paper is organized as follows. After a review of the literature (section 2), in section
3 we introduce two simple voting games: a simultaneous and a sequential one. We provide
intuitions for the results and discuss the emerging equilibria. In section 4, we change the
players’ preferences and solve the same games accordingly. A discussion about the Italian
Constitutional Court introduces section 5, where we consider an heterogenous committee at
work. In section 6, we brieﬂy provide preliminary results and intuitions to some extensions
of the basic model. Finally, in section 7 we discuss the limits of our model, suggest some
possible developments of the research and draw our conclusions.
2 Review of the literature
First contributions analyzing voting behaviors date back to the work of Condorcet2,m o r et h a n
two centuries ago. One of his main results is the Jury Theorem. It states that, in dichotomous
elections3, a large population of identical voters is more likely to select the best alternative
than a single individual. In this contest, information is provided by (discrete) signals about
the true state of the world. So, majority rules in elections allows for the best outcome.
Still, until last decade, the traditional approach has considered mainly the mathematical and
statistical properties of these situations. Only recently, voting games have been analyzed as
strategic ones, that is, game theory has been used to solve them.
Two contributions in this area are particularly relevant for our paper. Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1996, 1997) analyze how well simultaneous voting elections can aggregate private
information. Their results are worth discussing but the papers are not directly comparable
with ours, as they focus on the asymptotic properties of their models (i.e., as the number of
agents goes to inﬁnity). In their former work, the authors want to explain the low rates of
participation in many elections and emphasize the similarity between dichotomous elections
with asymmetric information and auctions with a common value. In both cases, a player
must condition his strategy not simply on his private information but also taking into ac-
count the fact that he may be decisive (i.e., he is the winner of the auction or the swing
voter in the election). In equilibrium, uninformed independent voters, whenever they are
indiﬀerent between two options, prefer to abstain and not inﬂuence the outcome of the game.
Informed independent voters choose according to their private information (a binary signal)
whereas partisan voters always choose their favorite option. That is, no player plays a strictly
dominated strategy. Mixed strategy equilibria (for the uninformed ones) are also possible.
Surprisingly, they only involve a mix between abstention and voting for one candidate and
not a mix between choosing one of the two options.
In the latter contribution, the authors rule out abstention (as we do in our model). They
2“Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues la pluralite des voix”, 1785.
3Elections with two opposite alternatives. For instance, when the choice is between rejecting or adopting
an option.
3discuss equilibrium strategies when voters play strategically and have diﬀerent preferences. In
this model, the symmetric Nash equilibria involve the informed independent voters playing ac-
cording to their signal and the partisan ones playing their favourite option. Their main result
is that (large) elections are decided by informed players and therefore they satisfy full informa-
tion equivalence, that is, they successfully aggregate private information. Nevertheless, this is
true as long as the informational structure is not very complex: with high uncertainty about
the distribution of preferences and additional possible choices, the eﬀectiveness of elections
is weaker. In our paper, we conﬁrm these equilibrium strategies for informed independent
players and partisan ones; we also ﬁnd optimal replies for independent uninformed players.
Yet, our model deals with a small committee and uninformed statuses are never revealed.
The outcome of the election can be determined even by uninformed voters and therefore
information cannot be fully aggregated.
In the last decade, a growing literature about herd behavior has developed as well4.I n
economics, herding refers to the loss of information due to imitation of previous players’
actions. From an information aggregation point of view, this is clearly ineﬃcient. But eliciting
information from the sequential structure may be in fact be desirable. So, there is a trade oﬀ
which is worthy of analysis.
Most relevant references in herding are by Smith and Sørensen (2000) and Goeree, Palfrey
and Rogers (2003). They both show how the importance of herding can be weaker when
we introduce heterogenous preferences. Goeree, Palfrey and Rogers (2003) analyze the case
with both private and common values (i.e.: preferences depending on the ﬁnal outcome of
the ballot but also on some ideological bias). Smith and Sørensen (2000) consider diﬀerences
only along the common value dimension. The main assumption in this literature is that other
players’ actions do not inﬂuence each player’s own payoﬀs. We show that this assumption
does not necessarily hold in a sequential voting procedure.
Voting and herd behavior are naturally joined together in the analysis of sequential voting
games.
Two main papers discuss sequential voting games5. Dekel and Piccione (2000) compare
simultaneous and sequential voting games where individuals observe a signal about the true
value of an option. Then, they decide whether to accept this option (“yes”) or to stay with
a status quo (“no”). Every player votes after observing his signal and previous players’
choice. More than one individual can vote in each period. Their main result is that both
simultaneous and sequential voting games are eﬀective in aggregating information. Moreover,
as far as symmetric equilibria are concerned, the sequential structure cannot do better than
the simultaneous one. The intuition is not very diﬃcult. Voters are behaving strategically and
condition their actions on being pivotal in the election. As long as strategies are symmetric
4See the seminal contributions by Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandany, Hirsh-
leifer and Welch (1992, 1998).
5Sloth (1993) introduces and discusses sequential voting games, but only as a device to solve simultaneous
ones. She shows that sophisticated equilibria in the former games are equivalent to subgame perfet equilibria
in the latter.
4and conditional, knowing who voted before you does not provide any useful information. This
result applies to certain asymmetric equilibria as well (but they do not state a general rule). An
interesting application is provided by elections with a common value for the alternative, that
is, elections with the sole aim to aggregate private information. In (the unique) equilibrium,
information is fully aggregated until an option is chosen; afterwards, the players do not need to
vote informatively as they are no longer pivotal. This equilibrium recalls some characteristics
of herd behavior. Of course, this result does not necessary hold in any setting. In an example,
the authors show that it is possible to ﬁnd a better (asymmetric strategies) equilibrium
with sequential voting when there are more than two signals. This last point is important
and leaves an open door to further research. Our own paper provides an analysis of cases
where the best equilibrium strategy proﬁles are asymmetric ones. Nevertheless, we are not
directly interested in how information is aggregated and consider players with heterogeneous
preferences. In addition, even in games with homogeneous players, our environment is not
totally symmetric: not necessarily every player observes a signal.
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) consider a game where members of a committee (“experts”)
sequentially reveal their opinions to a decision maker and ﬁnally a decision is taken. Members
care about their reputation but not directly about the ﬁnal decision. That is, they only want
to show (to the market) that they make the right choice. Each of them observes a diﬀerent
signal but he does not know its quality. If the signal is very diﬀerent from the common
prior he shares with the other players, than he prefers to pool and play uninformatively.
This lost of information parallels the ﬁndings of herding literature. The authors also try
to endogenize the order of speech to ﬁnd an optimal one. In general, better experts should
speak ﬁrst. As herding arises, some information may be lost. This is especially true with
more than ﬁve members and with greater heterogeneity in the quality of the experts. With
experts of unknown ability, there are equilibria in simultaneous games dominating equilibria
in sequential ones. The opposite is true with known ability. Our paper may be viewed as a
particular case where all the voters have the same known ability. We introduce heterogeneity
in terms of preferences (and not ability) and ﬁnd that the optimal order of voting actually
depends on them.
3 Voting games with truth purpose
In this section, we study two voting games, both based on the following setting.
A committee must take a binary decision: it can accept an alternative or reject it. Suppose
the number of members, n, to be 3 and the required majority to be 2. The status quo has
a common value of 0. For any member m of the committee (with m ∈ M = {i,j,z}), the
alternative can take two common values: vm ∈{ 1;−1}. E a c hv a l u eh a st h es a m ep r i o r( i . e . ,1
2)
but a private signal about the true one can be observed with probability α. As we are dealing
with “experts”, we assume α ∈ [1
2,1]6. When observed, the signal is correct with probability
6This assumption is made without loss of generality.
5β. For simplicity, we ﬁx β =1 7. Every player expresses a vote and abstention is not possible.
A strategy consists in a member’s voting behavior. The usual notation applies: sm is the
generic player m’s strategy and s−m is everyone else’s one. In this section, we assume that
the players are mainly interested in the committee taking the right decision (truth purpose).
Nevertheless, they are not willing to reveal an uninformed status to their fellow committee
members, so any information transmission occurs solely through voting behavior (i.e., there
is no pre-voting debate). We may think of this case as a situation where the public (rectius,
who appoints the committee) observes only the ﬁnal decision.
We now deﬁne optimality in our context.
Deﬁnition 1 (Optimality) A generic player m’s strategy sm is individually optimal (s∗
m)
when it maximizes the player m’s own utility function, um(sm | s−m):
s∗
m :a r gm a xum(sm | s−m)
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l es =( si,s j,s z) is socially optimal (s∗) when it maximizes the probability that
the committee takes the right decision (or, equivalently, the expected value of the election),
given the available signals.
s∗ :a r gm a xE(vm)
We need deﬁnition 1 to stress that optimality is here deﬁned as a constrained concept.
Due to lack of communication, full information aggregation is not always possible. This means
that for members with truth purpose, individual and social optimum coincide. We will refer
to our former constrained concept simply as optimality and to the latter as full information
optimality. We say that the concept is constrained as with full information the probability of
taking the right decision is always higher8.
The probability of taking the right decision in the simultaneous voting game with truth
purpose is therefore the only benchmark case we will refer to through the paper, when dis-
cussing the eﬃciency implications of diﬀerent committee compositions or voting mechanisms.
At this point, it is worth noting the diﬀerence between herding literature and this case.
Herd behaviour and cascades are a consequence of optimizing behavior of agents, whose utility
is independent from followers’ actions. They ﬁnd it optimal to ignore their private information
as they are not concerned with its eﬀects on subsequent players.
Now, is this still true in voting games with truth purpose? Consider a committee of three
members as described above and where votes occur sequentially. The ﬁrst and third player play
the following strategy: play the signal if observed, randomize if not. Then, assume the ﬁrst
chooses “yes”. If the second player is uninformed, he assigns a probability α+ 1
2(1−α) > 1
2 to
“yes” being the true state. Indeed, he thinks that the ﬁrst player voted “yes” either because he
was informed (probability α) or because he randomized as uninformed (probability 1−α). We
7See section 6 for preliminary results when β<1.
8See footnote 11.
6may think that the second player should follow, as the probability of being right by imitating
(left-hand side of the previous inequality) is higher than by randomizing (right-hand side).
Is this our conclusion? If so, we would have a typical result of herd behavior. Well, this is
not necessarily the case. He may optimize as well by doing exactly the opposite! In this way,
the responsibility of the right decision is given to the third player, whose probability of being
right is exactly the same as the ﬁrst one: α + 1
2(1 − α).
Herding is not a straightforward conclusion in this sequential voting game. The reason is
that a player’s utility is no longer independent of the followers’ actions.
Bearing in mind this example, we can now analyze two types of voting games: a simulta-
neous and a sequential one.
3.1 The simultaneous voting game
Two signals about the true state of the world are possible: ωm = {H;L}, a n de a c hp l a y e r
observes a signal with known and common probability α ∈ [1
2,1]9. If the true value of the
alternative is 1(−1), then the only possible signal is H(L). With a little abuse of notation,
we say that the information set of the generic player m is simply Ωm = {ωm} when he is
informed, as he perfectly knows the true state of the world, which is equal to the signal he
observes; on the contrary, when he is uninformed his information set is Ωm = {H,L}.
We also assume that players condition their strategy on being pivotal. Of course, any
strategy is optimal when the player is not pivotal. So, we concentrate on weakly dominant
strategies.
Proposition 1 introduces the ﬁrst (and only) symmetric equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1 The simultaneous voting game with truth purpose has only one symmetric
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the generic player m’s strategy sm is:
sm =
￿
play ωm if Ωm = {ωm};
randomize 50 : 50 if Ωm = {H,L}
￿
Individual optimality requires that every player plays his signal if observed, as this is right
with probability β =1 . It is not straightforward what happens if the signal is not observed.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the uninformed player i is indiﬀerent between accepting or
rejecting the alternative. He also knows that:
s−i =
￿
play ω−i if Ω−i = {ω−i};
randomize 50 : 50 if Ω−i = {H,L}
￿
, where − i = j,z
As α ≥ 1
2,ik n o w st h a ti ti sv e r yl i k e l yt h a ta tl e a s to n eo ft h eo t h e rt w op l a y e r so b s e r v e da
signal, so he should follow him. Unfortunately, this is not possible in a simultaneous game. As
9A model with three signals, where in each state the correct signal is observed with probability α and an
uninformative one with probability 1 − α, is isomorphic to this one.
7i is conditioning his strategy on being pivotal, he assumes that j and z played the opposite.
Given their strategy, i is indiﬀerent between following j or z.T h eb e s ti can do is randomizing
as well.
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the only and the best possible equilibrium strategy
proﬁle. In appendix, we prove that there are several better equilibria if we allow for asym-
metric strategies.
Consider the following strategy:
si(j,z) :
￿
play ωi(j,z) if Ωi(j,z) = {ωi(j,z)};
play “yes” with probability p(q,r)i fΩ i(j,z) = {H,L}
￿
that is, playing the signal if observed and playing “yes” with some probability if not.
As we argued before, the ﬁrst part of the strategy must be optimal, as the signal is always
correct. As regards the second, we must solve for the utility maximizing probabilities. Before
introducing and discussing proposition 2, which characterizes the set of equilibria of this game,
we need deﬁnition 2.
Deﬁnition 2 (Compensation) Two players are compensating each other when the follow-
ing two conditions are satisﬁed:
• they are both uninformed;
• they play “yes” with probabilities whose sum is equal to 1. When these probabilities
take extreme values (i.e., 0 or 1), then their actions involve “compensation in pure
strategies”.
Proposition 2 The simultaneous voting game with truth purpose has a continuum of equi-
libria in weakly dominant strategies. In any of the equilibrium strategy proﬁle, every member
plays according to the signal, if any, and plays “yes” with the following probabilities if not:
{p,q,r ∈ [0,1]3 : q + r =1 ,qr=0 },
{p,q,r ∈ [0,1]3 : p +q =1 ,pq=0 },
{p,q,r ∈ [0,1]3 : p +r =1 ,pr=0 },




The socially optimal equilibrium strategies are asymmetric ones and involve compensation in
pure strategies.
We have already discussed the logic behind the internal solution. Using deﬁnition 2, we
can state that there is only one equilibrium with compensation in mixed strategies and it
does not maximize social welfare as we have deﬁned it. The corner solutions are equilibria
8with compensation in pure strategies. In graph 1, we show the ranges of possible equilibria
f o rﬁ x e dv a l u e so fp. On the horizontal axis we measure q and on the vertical one r.
Graph 1: Equilibrium strategies in the simultaneous voting game
(1a)



























In the contour graphs, the lighter the colour the higher the value of the represented
function (in this case, the committee’s expected value). As we have shown, for the internal
value p = 1
2, an equilibrium is reached when q = r = 1
2. Nevertheless, it evident that this
is only a saddle point and so it is not optimal. For extreme values of p (graphs 1a and 1b),
the maximum is reached by ﬁxing either q or r in order to compensate p, leaving the other
probability free to change in the set [0,1]. For every internal value of p (i.e., graph 1c),qand
r must compensate each other at extreme values (i.e., q =0 ;r = 1) to maximize the social
welfare.
Given α = 1
2, the maximum possible expected value of the election is E(vm)=3
8. In graph
1c, this level is reached in all the combinations of q and r represented by a white area, that
is q =0 ,r=1a n dq =1 ,r=0 .10.
As long as individuals are uninformed, at least two of the players should compensate each
other in order to minimize their inﬂuence on the outcome of the game. This compensation
reaches the social optimum when it is played in pure strategies, that is, corner solutions
dominate the symmetric one. For p = q = r = α = 1




The diﬀerence between full information aggregation and our constrained concept of opti-
mality can be eﬀectively addressed here. It is probably better understood with an example.








play according to the signal if observed;






play according to the signal if observed;






play according to the signal if observed;
always play “no” if uninformed (i.e., r =0 )
￿
.
10Unfortunately, some confusion may arise as the borders of the graphs are white as well.
9Conditional on L being the true state, the decision is always correct. Anyway, conditional
on H being the true state, the ﬁnal decision may be wrong in two cases: either no one is
informed or only j is informed. Both the cases has a probability of 1
8 when α = 1
2 and the
expected value of the election, as already stated, is 3
8. If we could fully aggregate information,
then the committee could be wrong only when no one was informed, as j could share his





We believe that this compensation result has some similarities to the one in Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996). In that case, the optimal strategy for uninformed members was to
abstain. In our model, abstention is not possible but can be mimicked by compensation.
The problem with compensation is that it may prevent full aggregation of information, as
an uninformed player, when compensating, might in fact cancel out the vote of an informed
player.
3.2 The sequential voting game
The model we develop in this subsection is slightly more complex. Followers (can) have diﬀer-
ent actions according to diﬀerent histories of the game. This also means that the information
set of the generic player m, Ωm, contains the signal, if observed, and the voting history. The
voting history is the collection of votes, or decisions d, expressed by members who have




play ωi if Ωi = {ωi};
play “yes” with probability p if Ωi = {H,L}
 
,





play ωj if Ωj = {ωj,d i};
if Ωj = {H,L;di}:
play “yes” with probability qY when di =“ y e s ”





that is, j votes according to his signal if observed, as this is always correct, independently on
t h ev o t ec a s t e db yi. On the contrary, when j does not observe a signal, he conditions his vote
11See Appendix for a proof and a derivation of the expected value of the election with full information
aggregation.
10on i’s decision. Finally:
sz :

      
      
play ωz if Ωz = {ωz,d i,d j}
if Ωz = {H,L;di,d j}:
play “yes” with probability rYY when di = dj =“ y e s ”
play “yes” with probability rYN when di =“ y e s ”a n ddj =“ n o ”
play “yes” with probability rNY when di =“ n o ”a n ddj =“ y e s ”
play “yes” with probability rNN when di = dj =“ n o ”

      
      
,
which means that z always follows his signal, if any, and conditions his vote to the voting
history when uninformed. Each player’s strategy is no longer independent from previous
voters’ ones. From Dekel and Piccione (2000), we know that any symmetric equilibrium in
the simultaneous voting game is an equilibrium in the sequential one. Hence, independently of
history, playing “yes” with probability 1
2 when uninformed is still an optimal strategy for each
player. But the best equilibria we are dealing with are asymmetric ones. We are therefore
interested in understanding whether they can be replicated in this diﬀerent game and, above
all, whether a better equilibrium strategy proﬁle can be found.
The game is solved as before but for the presence of more variables (probabilities). The
analysis is simpliﬁed if we note that rYY and rNN are irrelevant, as a decision has already
been taken.
The results are presented in proposition 3, which is then discussed (and proved in ap-
pendix).
Proposition 3 Every equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the simultaneous game is also an equilib-
rium in the sequential one, but more equilibria are sustainable in the latter. These additional
equilibria (in weakly dominant strategies) still involve compensation in pure strategies and are
optimal. They are characterized by the following properties: when informed, members vote





rYN = rNY =1− p;
prYN =0 ;








qN = qY =1− p;
pqY =0 ;








rYN =1− qY  = rNY =1− qN;





in the second one. The maximum expected value of the election is the same as in the simul-
taneous game.
11Both the new equilibria are corner solutions. The ﬁrst new equilibrium is a straightforward
extension of the previous one, as once two players compensate each other, it does not make any
diﬀerence whether the third is discriminating (as in the sequential game) or not (simultaneous
game).
The last equilibrium proﬁle is the most diﬀerent one and all the players diﬀerentiate their
actions. The intuition behind this last case is the following. Suppose qY =1 :t h i sm e a n s
that, after the ﬁrst player i votes “yes”, the second player j always plays “yes” if uninformed.
Then, the third player z knows that, if he observes j voting “no”, then it must be case that
j is informed and “no” is the correct choice. The optimal answer for z is playing rYN =0 .
When qY =0 , then the optimal reply is rYN =1 . Now z can not infer from observing j voting
“no” whether he is informed or not: so the best he can do is compensating when uninformed.
Of course, compensation is socially bad if j is actually informed. It is exactly the possibility
of this information destruction which precludes full aggregation of information. A similar
argument explains the relation between rNY and qN.
The range of equilibria is wider than in the simultaneous game. Compensation is still a
condition but this may occur through in more complex ways, as, for instance, compensation
conditional on the voting history involved in the last equilibrium strategy proﬁle we discussed.
Quite surprisingly, the possibility of discriminating the action according to the history
does not provide any improvement from a social welfare point of view. This means that the
sequential structure does not add anything to the information aggregation process.
The only gain is that coordination appears to be more credible when players vote sequen-
tially.
4 Voting games with reputational purpose
Suppose now the members in the same committee are only interested in appearing informed.
They do not care about the ﬁnal decision of the committee but want to show that they are
right, even when they are uninformed. In this context, “being right” means voting according
to the true state of the world. That is, voting “yes” when vm = 1 and voting “no” when
vm = −1. The opposite is true for “being wrong”.
In this game, voters clearly care about their own reputation (reputational purpose). A
tension with the social optimal behavior might therefore emerge.
T h er e s to ft h em o d e ld o e sn o tc h a n g e :t h ep l a y e r ss t i l lf a c et w os t a t e so ft h ew o r l da n d
can observe one of the two possible signals with probability α ∈ [1
2,1].
The new utility function of the generic member m is the following
um =
 
1w h e n m is right
0w h e n m is wrong
In this section we solve again a simultaneous and a sequential game, showing how the
equilibrium strategies depend on the agents’ utility functions.
124.1 The simultaneous voting game
A player’s strategy no longer needs to be conditional on the fact that he is pivotal. Even
though he knows he cannot inﬂuence the committee’s ﬁnal decision, a player is still maximizing
his expected utility function.
Suppose m plays the usual generic strategy:
sm :
 
play ωm if Ωm = {ωm};
play “yes” with probability p if Ωm = {H,L}
 
that is, playing the signal if observed and playing “yes” with some probability if not.




which is independent on the probability p. So, proposition 4 follows.






play ωm if Ωm = {ωm};
play “yes” with any probability p ∈ [0,1] if Ωm = {H,L}
 
The solutions found in the game of section 3.1 are only particular cases of these ones.
As in this game any probability p,q and r is an equilibrium strategy, the social welfare is
not necessarily maximized. We recall that social optimality requires compensation in pure
strategies.
4.2 The sequential voting game
In the sequential version of this game, the ﬁrst player is in the same situation as in the previous
subsection. We still assume that members vote in this order: i,j,z.
So, player i plays “yes” with any p ∈ [0,1] and is right with probability 1+α
2 .
When uninformed, the second player should play as the ﬁrst one, as 1+α
2 > 1
2.T h el e f t
hand side of the inequality is the probability that the i is right, whereas the right hand side
is the probability that j is right by randomizing. If informed, then j should play according
to the signal.
The third player z faces two possible cases: i and j played the same or they played the
opposite. As long as z has a signal, the diﬀerence does not matter, as he knows his signal is
always correct and he plays it. But if he is uninformed, then he should follow j. Indeed, if j
and i played the same, this is straightforward, as z is observing two voters doing the same.
But if they did not, then the only reason why j played the opposite is that he was informed,
so he must be followed.
According to our discussion, proposition 5 holds.




play ωi if Ωi = {ωi};





play ωj(z) if Ωj(z) = {ωj(z);di(j)};
play as the previous player if Ωj(z) = {H,L;di(j)}
 
This equilibrium is clearly diﬀerent from the ones above. As soon as an individual is
uninformed, imitation arises. We cannot really talk of herding, as no information is lost in
the process.
In the next subsection, we compare all these results and comment our ﬁndings.
4.3 Comments
In table 1, we report equilibrium strategies of the games we analyzed. In all of them, there is a
common action, that is, “play the signal if any”. For this reason, we focus only on the actions
a player should take in equilibrium when he is uninformed. The table is bi-dimensional. On
the horizontal line we discriminate about the utility function of the agents: the ﬁrst column
represents agents caring about the correct choice by the committee. On the vertical dimension,
we consider the diﬀerent voting games: the simultaneous and the sequential one.
In both the voting games with a common truth interest, herding is not a consequence. Ac-
tually, all the equilibria involve compensating behavior, i.e., destruction of possible cascades.
The idea behind this result is that no uninformed member wishes to inﬂuence too much the
ﬁnal outcome of the game. As abstention is not possible, the only way to reach this result is
through some coordination. As we pointed out, there are several equilibria in truth purpose
games and the best ones involve pure strategy for two of the players.












On the contrary, in voting games with reputational concerns, a diﬀerence emerges between
the sequential and the simultaneous structure. The former weakly dominates the latter in
social welfare terms.




[Y (·|vm =1 )− Y (·|vm = −1)],
14where the function Y (·) represents the probability that “yes” wins when either vm =1o r
vm = −1. In particular:
Y (p | vm =1 )=[ α +(1− α)p]+( 1− α)(1 − p)α
Y (p | vm = −1) = (1 − α)3p +( 1− α)2αp
When vm =1 , the committee votes “yes” whenever the ﬁrst player votes “yes” or when
he does not but the second player is informed. When vm = −1, the committee votes “yes”






, ∀p ∈ [0,1]
which is the maximum value of the function for this particular value of α.
Every equilibrium in game D is socially optimal whereas only a few of the multiple equi-
libria in game C are. When β = 1 and players have reputational purposes, then imitation
arises in the sequential game and it is an eﬃcient behavior. The existence of equilibria which
are all optimal is quite surprising as we are dealing with a game where social welfare is not
the objective of the players. But this is not exact: actually, social welfare is not necessarily
the objective of the players. When it is compatible with their individual aims, then it can be
a result, as in this case.
5 Voting games with heterogeneous players
So far, we have focused on homogenous players: they all have the same ability (i.e., the prob-
ability that their signal is correct is the same) and the same preferences. We now introduce
heterogeneity. In this context, heterogeneity can have two dimensions: on the one hand, it
may concern the ability of the players; on the other hand, it may regard their objective func-
tions. The former type of heterogeneity has been already widely analyzed (see, for example,
Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2001). Quite surprisingly, no paper deals with the possibility of dif-
ferent preferences in sequential voting games (Feddersen and Pesendorfer does, but only in
simultaneous games). We believe that the order of vote is relevant in the sequential game.
This is one of the reasons for deciding to concentrate on this point.
The other reason is the fact that, in real life, we may expect to observe committees
where members do not share exactly the same preferences. One possible example is the
Italian Constitutional Court. According to the Italian Constitution (art. 135 catch 1), the 15
members of this court are experienced judges, one third of whom is appointed by the President
of the Republic, one third by high levels of the magistrature and the remaining one third by
the Parliament. It is not so strange to imagine that each of them could have, in principle,
diﬀerent preferences. We could suppose that the presidential ones are totally independent;
the technical ones mainly status seeker and, ﬁnally, the Parliament ones are policy biased, in
15order to favour the party which appointed them. This assumption about types is very strong.
We do not actually believe that a biased member is necessarily and exclusively concerned with
satisfying his political side, neither that the status seeker has no interest in social welfare,
nor that the truth seeker has no political opinions. A more accurate model would weight
each of these three components for each of the members, but we reckon that this additional
complexity would not add relevant insights to the current model.
Before introducing our main model, we devote a subsection to the study of this Italian
institution, trying to understand historical and political reasons of his peculiar composition.
Our model will then provide game theoretic foundations to it.
5.1 The Italian Constitutional Court
T h eC o n s t i t u t i o n a lC o u r th a sb e e ni n t r o d u c e di nt h eI t a l i a nl e g a la n dp o l i t i c a ls y s t e mb y
the Constitution of the Republic. This document was approved at the end of 1947 by the
Constitutional Assembly, on the basis of a proposal made by a subcommittee, called the
Committee of the 75s. The Court has been existing only since 1955 and its ﬁrst sentence
dates back to 1956.
Articles 134-137 of the Constitution are devoted to its organization; nevertheless, we are
only interested in two of them. According to art. 134, the Court is in charge of solving:
• questions about the constitutionality of national and regional laws;
• conﬂicts among bodies of the State, among State and regions and among regions them-
selves;
• accusations against the President of the Republic.
In addition, the Court decides whether requests of referenda are admissible (constitutional
law no. 1/53, art. 2). The duties of the Court are extremely important, as they strongly
inﬂuenced the debate about its composition12, which is our main interest here.
Indeed, two main opinions emerged in the Constitutional Assembly: for some members,
the Court was mainly a political body and therefore needed to be controlled by a political
organization. These people thought that the Parliament should have been in charge of ap-
pointing all its members and that membership itself should end after new political elections.
For other members, the Court was basically a legal body; in particular, it should be indepen-
dent of the political power exactly for his duty of “judge” of the Parliament itself, where the
judgment is about the constitutional correctness of its decisions.
The proposal presented by the 75s (art. 127 of the proposal) stated that half of the Court
was composed by judges, a quarter by lawyers and professors and a quarter by citizens. All of
them were appointed by the Parliament, who could choose from a list of names (three times
the required number of members), and were in oﬃce for nine years.
12The source for this debate is Falzone, Palermo and Cosentino (1976).
16In the Assembly, the latter position was dominant and some catches were changed. In
particular, according to art. 135 of the approved Constitution, the Court is composed by
ﬁfteen members, chosen only among judges (even if retired), lawyers with more than 20 years
of experience and professors. Among these ﬁfteen members:
• ﬁve are appointed by the President of the Republic;
• ﬁve by the Parliament;
• ﬁve by the highest judges.
As we can see, the political control has become milder, also considering the fact that the
oﬃce of a member lasts nine years and the one of an MP no more than ﬁve (unless he is
reelected).
The ﬁnal decision of the Assembly was in favour of the “jurisdictional” view of the Court.
Despite this and in line with the strong compromise behavior of its members, some political
control has been guaranteed to the Parliament. The necessity of a balance among political
and jurisdictional duties of the court eventually emerged.
Whether this choice is ineﬃcient or not from a social welfare point of view is the question
we wish to answer in the rest of this work.
5.2 A model of voting games with heterogeneous players
Trying to mirror the composition of the Italian “Corte Costituzionale”, we study the behavior
of a committee with heterogeneous players. For simplicity, we still assume β =1a n dt h ee x i s -
tence of the following three members. The ﬁrst is a truth seeker one, a social optimizer chosen
by the president of the Republic; the second is a status seeker one, mainly concerned about
his reputation among other judges, who elected him. Finally, the third is a policy biased one,
interested in satisfying the party who supported him. We label them as I (independent, with
truth purpose),R(status seeker, with reputation purpose) and P (policy biased) respectively.
The ﬁrst two players’ objective functions are already known:
uI : E(v)




1w h e n R t a k e st h er i g h td e c i s i o n
0w h e n R takes the wrong decision
Additional speciﬁcations about P are necessary. His bias b can take two values: b :
{Y,N}. We call him conservative if he is biased towards the status quo option (bP = N),
and reformist when he prefers the alternative (bP = Y ). He always supports his political
17opinion, systematically ignoring his private information. His utility is a function u(o)o ft h e
ﬁnal outcome of the game, o. When the alternative passes (“yes” wins), then o = Y ;w h e n
the alternative looses (“no” wins), then we have o = N. Accordingly, u(o) can assume two
values. Suppose P is a reformist; then u(Y )=1a n du(N)=0 . On the contrary, if he is a
conservative, it is true that u(Y )=0a n du(N)=1 .To summarize:
uP :
￿
1w h e n o = b
0w h e n o  = b
Preferences are common knowledge among the players and we assume P to be a re-
formist13.
It is worth stressing, especially if the reader thinks in terms of the example provided, that
uninformativeness in this case should be interpreted as noisiness of available information. For
instance, a judge is said to be uninformed when there are strong arguments supporting both
the possibilities (rejecting or accepting).
The remaining assumptions of the model remain the same.
5.2.1 The simultaneous voting game
We ﬁrst present the main result of the game and then we illustrate it.
Proposition 6 In the simultaneous voting game with three heterogeneous players, multiple
equilibria (in weakly dominant strategies) arise, including a unique socially optimal equilib-
rium.
We now prove the above proposition. Suppose P is a reformist. Then he has a simple
dominant strategy, which is as follows:
s∗
P : {always play “yes”},
as it maximizes his payoﬀ function.
As for R, we know from previous discussion that in the simultaneous voting game his




play ωR if ΩR = {ωR};
play “yes” with any probability q ∈ [0,1] if ΩR = {H,L}
￿
Finally, the independent player’s equilibrium strategy must look like the following:
sI :
￿
play ωI if ΩI = {ωI};
play “yes” with probability p if if ΩI = {H,L}
￿
,
13In the thesis, we also allow for weaker biases, but the results do not substantially change.





[Y (p,q | v =1 )− Y (p,q | v = −1)]
where Y (·) is the probability that “yes” wins. As P’s strategy is unique and certain (P always
votes “yes”), uI only depends upon q and p. In particular, the expected value of the election
is negatively related to both p and q. When v =1 , the committee expresses a positive vote
when at least I or R is informed or, if uninformed, at least one of them votes “yes”:
Y (p,q | v =1 ):
[α +p(1 − α)][α + q(1 − α)] +
[α +p(1 − α)(1 − q)(1 − α)+
(1 − p)(1 − α)[α + q(1 − α)]
When v = −1, the committee expresses a positive vote when at least I or R is uninformed
and votes “yes”:
Y (p,q | v = −1) :
(1 − α)2pq +
(1 − α)p[(α +( 1− q)(1 − α)] +





[αp(α − 1) + αq(α −1) + α(2 − α)]
The utility maximizing level of p must be 0. As I cannot choose q, an equilibrium does not
need to be optimal. There is anyway one socially optimal equilibrium which is reached when
R plays q =0a sw e l l .
In other words, given P’s dominant strategy, I’s best reply is compensation in pure strate-
gies, as in the truth purpose game. R’s strategy is independent from the other’s ones, so in
general we should not expect a social optimal equilibrium proﬁle to be selected.
The result is anyway striking in the sense that optimality is note ruled out, even if one
player (namely, P) is completely ignoring his own private information. It is obtained only
when there is a high compensation from R’s and I’s sides, that is, when they both play
the same strategy and this strategy tries to oﬀset P’s strong bias. It is relatively easy to
understand why this result is correct. Assume that the true state is H: then no information
is lost by P. In particular, his action in this case (but not his strategy) recalls that one of the
player who always votes “yes” when uninformed. To that action, I’s best response is exactly
the strategy we outlined here and, from a social welfare point of view, R c a np l a ya n yq. This
19proﬁle has been already shown to be one of the optimal ones in section 3.1. Suppose now the
true state is L: then, the right decision is always taken! If R and I are informed, then they
take the correct decision by deﬁnition. But if they are not, then they both play “no”, which
is exactly the correct choice to take.
Recalling the example we provided in subsection 3.1, we can show the similarities between
this game and the one with three truth seeker players. In the latter case, the committee
was possibly wrong in two cases: conditional on H being the true state, either no player was
informed or only j was informed. But this is exactly what happens here, except that we have
player P instead of player j. So, for both the equilibrium strategy proﬁles, the probability
that the ﬁnal decision is wrong is the same.
Despite multiplicity of suboptimal equilibria, we know that there is a unique socially
optimal equilibrium. In particular, both P and R plays a dominant strategy, to which I’s
best response is unique. Multiplicity only arises due to the fact that R can choose any level
of q ∈ [0,1].
Introducing heterogeneity is therefore relevant for the characterization of the equilibria of
the model. Even though equilibria are still multiple, their range is dramatically reduced.
5.2.2 The sequential voting game
In the sequential voting game, the order of vote turns out to be relevant. We link this result
to the presence of heterogeneous players as, so far, no optimal order has ever emerged. In the
following proposition, we present the main result of the game and then we illustrate it.
Proposition 7 The sequential voting game with three heterogeneous players, has a unique
socially optimal equilibrium when I votes before R. For other sequences, there are multiple
equilibria, only one of which is socially optimal.
To prove this proposition, we assume P to be a reformist. As his action is totally unin-
formative, his position is irrelevant. His strategy is:
s∗
P : {always play “yes”}
As regards R and I, we have two possibilities. If R votes before I, he has no additional
information on which to base his action, so he behaves as in the simultaneous voting game




play ωR if any;
play “yes” with any probability q ∈ [0,1] otherwise
￿





play ωI if any;
play “yes” with probability p =0o t h e r w i s e
￿
,
20like in the simultaneous voting game of the previous subsection.
We have already shown in the previous subsection that the ﬁrst best is only achieved when
q =0 . In general, there is a continuum of equilibria which are not optimal.




play ωI if any;
play “yes” with probability p =0o t h e r w i s e
￿




play ωR if any;
follow I if ΩR = {H,L;dI}
￿
This strategy is optimal for R, as there is a positive probability that I is informed and
therefore correct. But this strategy is socially optimal as well, as, when I is informed, then
an uninformed R imitates the correct choice. And if I is uninformed as well, then he plays
“yes” with probability p =0a n dR does the same, playing “yes” with probability q =0 .
This is exactly the optimal equilibrium proﬁle we found in the simultaneous voting game.
Moreover, this equilibrium is clearly unique. So the sequential structure actually works as an
“implementation mechanism” for the optimal strategy proﬁle.
6 Possible extensions of the basic models
In this section we informally discuss two natural possible extensions of the basic models
introduced in section 3 and 4. The ﬁrst one regards the accuracy of the signal (the parameter
β), while the second one concerns the number of players.




Simultaneous Game A Game C
Sequential Game B Game D
6.1 The eﬀect of noisy information
We now assume β ∈ (1
2,1], that is, the signal observed by the players is not necessarily correct.
As we are dealing with “experts”, we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume that the common β should
be bigger than 1
2. This choice is also without loss of generality, as, if β<1
2, then the utility
maximizing behavior would be just the opposite. With a positive probability of wrong signals,
we expect herding to arise, at least in the reputational sequential voting game.
21The main result of the subsection is that noisy signals are either ineﬀective on the players’
equilibrium strategies or, if they inﬂuence them, they are not source of ineﬃciency14.




play ωi(j,z) if Ωi(j,z) = {ωi(j,z)};
play “yes” with probability p(q,r)i fΩ i(j,z) = {H,L}
￿
The ﬁrst part of the strategy is optimal as a signal, despite its noisiness, unambiguously shifts
the player’s prior (remember that β>1
2). We then solve for the utility maximizing p,q and
r as before. We obtain that these probabilities are independent on the parameters α and
β. Therefore equilibrium strategies are unaﬀected. The fact is that these two parameters
inﬂuence only the expected value of election, which is indeed lower for lower values of α and
β.
Before analyzing game B, we focus on games with reputational purpose, as some of the
results will be useful for the remaining case.
Game C: simultaneous voting with reputational purpose We already know that, in
this simultaneous game, a player’s optimal strategy is independent from the others’ ones and
hence it is a dominant strategy. Consider the generic player i, playing the following strategy:
si :
￿
play ωi if Ωi = {ωi};
play “yes” with probability p if Ωi = {H,L}
￿
Again, the ﬁrst part of the strategy is optimal, as a signal shifts the player’s prior (equal to
1
2) about the true state of the world. We focus on p. It is straightforward to show that, again,
p is independent on α and β. In particular, the expected utility of the election is given by:
E(ui)=
1+2 αβ − α
2
which is non negative for any α ∈ [1
2,1] and β ∈ (1
2,1].
Game D: sequential voting with reputational purpose We begin with a deﬁnition,
which clariﬁes what we mean by “following” and “herding” in the rest of the section. We
recall that, with reputational purposes, the best choice is the one which is most likely to be
correct.
Deﬁnition 3 (Herding)We say that the generic player “j” is “following” the generic player
“i” when this is his best choice according to his (lack of) information. In line with the
literature, we say that “j” is “herding” when he disregards his own private signal.
14We refer the interested readers to the thesis for formal proofs and only present some intuitions.
22We must stress that a player always makes the best use of his available information. If he
does not have any signal, then he ﬁnds it optimal to imitate who might have observed some
signal. If he does have a signal, then he updates his prior according to all his information and
decides whether to follow his signal or herd.
For simplicity, we assume that the three players are voting in this order: i,j,z. Simply
by using Bayes’ rule, it is easy to show that herding might arise only from the third player
(z) onwards. In particular, herding requires four main conditions. First of all, the ﬁrst two
players (i and j) must vote for the same option. Secondly, z must be informed. Otherwise,
he is not giving up any information and simply following (from deﬁnition 3). Then, his signal
must contrast with the choice of i and j. Finally, the following condition about p, α and β
must hold15:







where α and β are known parameters, respectively about the probability of observing a signal
and his accuracy, and p is the probability that, when uninformed, i plays “yes”.
This herding condition means that when α is very low (α   1
2), it is unlikely that both i
and j observe a signal: for many values of the probability p, z trusts his signal and does not
herd. When α grows, it’s the term β which makes the diﬀerence. The higher the β, the lower
the p sustaining herding: z has stronger conﬁdence in his own signal. Finally, when α =1 ,
herding is a straightforward conclusion for any β and p16.
The conclusion of this discussion is that, in this case (with three players), herding is not
ineﬃcient from a social point of view, as it emerges only when the ﬁnal decision has already
been taken (z is not pivotal).
Game B: sequential voting with truth purpose This game mixes characteristics of the
previous sequential one and of game A. So, we can easily conclude that, if herding arises, it
is from the third player and it is therefore ineﬃcient.
6.1.1 Comments
We start from a comparison between the general case when β ∈ (1
2,1] and the special one when
β =1 . We can observe that nothing changes for players with truth purpose in a simultaneous
game. The expected value is lower for smaller β, but the equilibrium strategies are the
15This condition is true when i and j vote “yes” and z observes the L signal. See the next footnote for the
other case.
16In the symmetric case, where both i and j vote “no” but z has an H signal, the herding condition is






23same. When players are status seekers, the situation is more similar to a typical model
of herd behavior. For diﬀerent values of α,β and p, herding may arise. The third player
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to give up his private information about the true state of the world when
the probability that other players observed a signal is very high and the accuracy of this
information is not very sharp.
Finally, the possibility of maximizing the social welfare is not dramatically reduced when
we relax our assumption about β.This is clearly true for games A, B and C, as the equilibrium
strategies do not change. In game D, herding may arise and it is ineﬃcient from a social point
of view. Though, in this particular case, a committee with three members can not really do
worse than in the previous case (β =1 ) , a sh e r d i n go n l ya r i s e sw h e nt h ev o t e ri sn ol o n g e r
pivotal (i.e., he cannot inﬂuence the ﬁnal outcome of the game).
6.2 Changing the number of players
A further natural extension of our models is the analysis of committees composed of a diﬀerent
number of members.
First of all, we note that, as in game C the equilibrium strategy of the players is indepen-
dent from the others, the number of players is not an issue. We provide some intuitions for
the other cases, when n =2 ,4,5, but leave their analytical development to future research.
Game A: simultaneous voting with truth purpose When n = 2 or, in general, with an
even number of voters, we need a tie-breaking assumption. We assume that the alternative
passes when it receives n
2 + 1 votes, in other words, the status quo wins in case of parity.
Given two players i and j, it is easy to work out their equilibrium strategy. Following our
previous notation, we call p and q respectively the probability that i and j play “yes” when
uninformed. Then the optimal probabilities are p = q =1 . Compensation between players
does not emerge when n =2 . But we must stress the existence of a strong bias, that is, the
tie-breaking rule favouring the status quo17.
When n =5 , the optimal strategy requires four members compensating each other when
uninformed, with the last one free to play “yes” with any probability. Unfortunately, we do
not have a formal proof for this claim. Nevertheless, we can prove that the expected value
of the election is higher with 5 players than with 3 when they play the (putative) optimal
strategy. This result is in line with previous research stating that the more the players the
ﬁner the aggregation of information.
Game B: sequential voting with truth purpose When n =2 , it is very easy to work
out the optimal equilibrium strategy. Actually, it fully replicates game A. Recall from above
the deﬁnition of p,qY and qN : with the tie-breaking rule we chose, qN is irrelevant as a
decision has already been taken and we reduce the problem to the one we have just solved
above: p = qY =1 .
17With an opposite tie-breking rule, we obtain p = q =0 .
24As the number of players grows, calculations become more and more diﬃcult. We think
the basic result of the 3 players case still holds, that is, the sequential structure can not
improve the expected value of the election.
Game D: sequential voting with reputational purpose We know that for n =3 ,
herding may arise when the ﬁrst two members (i,j) voted the same and the third player (z)
has a signal in contrast with their choice. In particular, z herds when condition 1 is satisﬁed.
B u tf r o mas o c i a lp o i n to fv i e w ,h e r d i n gi sn o tap r o b l e m ,a sz is never pivotal when it occurs.
When n =4( a n da fortiori, for higher values of n), the player after z (say, k)m a yf a c e
a similar situation: he observes i,j,z voting the same but has an opposite signal. Then, he
should herd as well. The intuition is that, if condition 1 is enough for a cascade to start after
two players, then it must be the case that it is enough to start after three. And we can show
that herding always arises (or it continues). On the contrary, when k is informed but does
not observe three similar votes, he knows that he is not the only one with that signal and
therefore should consider it and play it.
With n>4 players, herding might become dangerous from a social welfare point of view,
as pivotal members of the committee are ignoring their own information.
7 Conclusions
As highlighted in the introduction, this paper tries to answer to two main questions. The
ﬁrst one is about the voting behaviour of socially oriented voters, when they are uninformed
and cannot abstain. The second is about the rationale for the presence of biased members in
committees whose aim is to maximize social welfare.
To do this, we solve and comment diﬀerent voting games. We ﬁrst discriminate among
games played sequentially and games played simultaneously. Some papers have already dis-
cussed how, in the former case, the probability of herding may arise and the information
aggregation process of the election may be ineﬃcient. Indeed, by herding, players give up
their private information and concur to create informational cascades.
We analyze the particular case of a committee composed of 3 members, which must take a
binary decision. For instance, it may decide whether to accept an alternative or reject it and
keep the status quo (which has a normalized value of 0). In case of acceptance, the alternative
can take two values: either 1 or —1, according to the true state of the world. Abstention is
not possible.
When players do not want to share their private information, the information aggrega-
tion process of the voting game may be ﬂawed. This is not necessarily true in setting with
simultaneous voting and a wide number of players but can be a serious consequence otherwise.
The traditional conclusions of the existing literature about sequential voting appear to
be strongly dependent on the objective function of the players. For this reason, we also
discriminate according to the members’ objective functions. We show that herding still arises
25if the committee is composed of players with reputation objectives, that is, players who want
to maximize their own probability of being right. But this is no longer true when players have
a truth purpose, that is, when they want to maximize the social welfare (i.e., the probability
that the committee takes the right decision). They might in fact decide to destroy possible
informational cascades, playing compensating strategies instead of herding. In particular,
optimality requires compensation in pure strategies. Compensation is an optimal behaviour
if players cannot abstain. Nevertheless, it prevents full aggregation of available information
and for this reason the optimality concept we refer to is deﬁned as “constrained” one.
The main contribution of the paper relies in the analysis of a committee with heterogeneous
members. Quite surprisingly, in the existing literature heterogeneity has exclusively regarded
the ability of the players (i.e., the noisiness of their signals/private information). In our model,
players with the same ability have in fact diﬀerent preferences. We model our environment
following the peculiar composition of the Italian Constitutional Court. According to the
Italian Constitution, one-third of its members are appointed by the Parliament, one-third by
the President of the Republic and one third by the highest judges. The historical and political
reasons for that concern the necessity of a balance among political and jurisdictional power.
We argue whether this composition is also eﬃcient in terms of social welfare (probability of
taking the right decision). Accordingly, we assume the existence of three members: a truth
seeker, a status seeker (with reputation purpose) and a political biased one. The answer is very
surprising: even with a political biased player, who constantly ignores his private information
and favours his political party, there exists an equilibrium, which is socially optimum. In
the simultaneous game, optimality requires some coordination, which may be not necessarily
realized. On the contrary, in the sequential game both optimality and uniqueness are reached,
simply given a particular order of voting.
8 Appendix: proofs
8.1 Proof of proposition 2
We provide a proof for proposition 2, which nests the proof for proposition 1 as well.
Proof. Consider the following strategy:
si(j,z) :
 
play ωi(j,z) if Ωi(j,z) = {ωi(j,z)};
play “yes” with probability p(q,r)i fΩ i(j,z) = {H,L}
 
,
The ﬁrst part of the strategy must be optimal, as the signal is always correct. As regards
the second, we want to solve for the proﬁt maximizing probabilities. When the actual value
is vm = 1 (ex ante possible with probability equal to 1
2), i plays “yes” with probability
α+(1−α)p (similarly for j and z), that is, the probability that he has the correct signal (H)
plus the probability of playing “yes” when he has no signal. We deﬁne the probability for the
committee as a whole to vote “yes” to be a function Y (p,q,r), where the probability of voting
26“no” is then 1 − Y (p,q,r). The expected value when the actual value is 1 is then given by:
E(vm|vm =1 ) = 1 [ Y (p,q,r|vm =1 ) ]+0[ 1− Y (p,q,r|vm =1 ) ]
= Y (p,q,r|vm =1 )
T h ea l t e r n a t i v ep a s s e sw h e ni tr e c e i v e sa tl e a s tt w ov o t e s . T h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a ta l lt h e
members vote “yes” is:
[α +( 1− α)p][α +( 1−α)q][α +( 1− α)r]( 1 )
The probability that only two members vote “yes” is:
[α +( 1− α)p][α +( 1− α)q](1− r)(1 − α)+ ( 2 )
[α +( 1− α)p](1− q)(1 − α)[α +( 1− α)r]+
(1 − p)(1 − α)[α +( 1− α)q][α +( 1− α)r]
Therefore:
E(vm|vm =1 )=Y (p,q,r|vm =1 )=( 1 )+( 2 )
When the actual value is vm = −1 (ex ante possible with probability equal to 1
2), i plays
“yes” with probability (1 − α)p (similarly for j and z), as the only possible signal is L. The
expected value is given by:
E(vm|vm = −1) = −1[Y (p,q,r|vm = −1)] + 0[1 − Y (p,q,r|vm = −1)]
= −Y (p,q,r|vm = −1)
The probability that all the members vote “yes” is:
(1 − α)3pqr (3)
The probability that only two members vote “yes” is:
(1 − α)2pq[α +( 1− r)(1 − α)] + (4)
(1 − α)2pr[α +( 1− q)(1 − α)] +
(1 − α)2qr[α +( 1− p)(1 − α)]
Therefore:
E(vm|vm = −1) = −Y (p,q,r|vm = −1) = (3) + (4)




[Y (p,q,r|vm =1 )− Y (p,q,r|vm = −1)]
27The equilibrium levels of p,q and r are obtained from the following:
max
p,q,r E(vm)=E(p,q,r)





∂p :1− q −r =0
∂E(vm)
∂q :1− p − r =0
∂E(vm)
∂r :1− p − q =0





1i f 1 − q − r>0
0i f 1 − q − r<0






1i f 1 − p − r>0
0i f 1 − p − r<0






1i f 1 − q − p>0
0i f 1 − q − p<0
∈ [0,1] if 1 − q − p =0
.
The only interior solution is
 
r = q = p = 1
2
 
, which is the symmetric equilibrium strategy
proﬁle. In addition, we have the following corner solutions:
{p,q,r ∈ [0,1]3 : q + r =1 ,qr=0 },
{p,q,r ∈ [0,1]3 : p +q =1 ,pq=0 },
{p,q,r ∈ [0,1]3 : p +r =1 ,pr=0 }.
8.2 Proof to proposition 4




play ωi if Ωi = {ωi};







play ωj if Ωj = {ωj,d i};
if Ωj = {H,L;di}:
play “yes” with probability qY when di =“ y e s ”







      
      
play ωz if Ωz = {ωz,d i,d j}
if Ωz = {H,L;di,d j}:
play “yes” with probability rYY when di = dj =“ y e s ”
play “yes” with probability rYN when di =“ y e s ”a n ddj =“ n o ”
play “yes” with probability rNY when di = “no” and dj =“ y e s ”
play “yes” with probability rNN when di = dj =“ n o ”

      
      






[Y (p,qN,q Y ,r NY,r YN | vm =1 )− Y (p,qN,q Y ,r NY,r YN | vm = −1)]
First of all, we notice that if we ﬁx qY = qN = q and rYN = rNY = r (i.e., the players
do not discriminate), then we go back to the previous case (simultaneous game) where the
players’ actions were not interdependent. So, every equilibrium proﬁle in the simultaneous
voting game is still an equilibrium in the sequential one. We avoid writing speciﬁc formulas
for these functions, as they are straightforward extensions of the previous case. We focus on
the ﬁrst order conditions (after useful simpliﬁcations) in order to understand what the range
of possible equilibria is:

      
      
∂E(vm)
∂p :2− qN − qY − rNY − rYN =0
∂E(vm)
∂qN :1− p − rNY =0
∂E(vm)
∂qY :1− p − rYN =0
∂E(vm)
∂rNY :1− p − qN =0
∂E(vm)
∂rYN :1− p − qY =0
As expected, the symmetric solution is still an equilibrium proﬁle:
 





In addition, it is still the only interior solution. Beside this, there are the following corner
solutions:
 
rYN = rNY =1−qY =1− qN;
qNrYN =0 ;∀p ∈ [0,1]
 
,
which is an equilibrium in the simultaneous game as well; and
{rYN = rNY =1− p;prYN =0 ;∀qY ,q N ∈ [0,1]}
{qN = qY =1− p;pqY =0 ;∀rYN,r NY ∈ [0,1]}
29which is a straightforward extension of the previous one, as once two players compensate each
other, it does not make any diﬀerence whether the third is discriminating (as in the sequential
game) or not (simultaneous game). Finally, we have the most diﬀerent proﬁle, where both




rYN =1− qY  = rNY =1− qN;





8.3 Proof of condition 1
We begin with a deﬁnition, which clariﬁes what we mean by “following” and “herding” in
the rest of the section. We recall that, with reputational purposes, the best choice is the one
which is most likely to be correct.
Deﬁnition 4 We say that the generic player “i” is “following” the generic player “j”w h e n
this is his best choice according to his own information. In line with the literature, we say
that “i” is “herding” when he disregards his own private information.
Proof. In the sequential voting game, the ﬁrst player (say, i)i si nt h es a m es i t u a t i o na s
any generic player in game C. When informed, he plays the signal; when uninformed, he plays
“yes” with any probability. As we show in the paper, he is correct with ex ante probability
1+2αβ−α
2 .As regards following players, they can elicit some information from previous voters’
actions. We use Bayes’ rule to update the priors and we deﬁne the following events:
Y : the true state is “Yes”;
X : the previous player(s) voted “Yes”
and the current player has a “No” signal.
Then, we introduce the herding condition:









Pr[Y ]Pr[X | Y ]
Pr[Y ]Pr[X | Y ]+P r [¯ Y ]Pr[X | ¯ Y ]
The herding condition in (5) states that, if the posterior belief (left hand side) is greater then
the indiﬀerence point (right hand side), then the current player should ignore his own private
information and follow the previous one(s).
30• Starting from the second player (say, j), he faces three possible cases:




— If he is informed and the signal is in line with i’s choice, then there is a higher
probability that the signal is correct. So, j should play his signal (or follow i,
which is equivalent).
— If he is informed but the signal contrasts with i’sc h o i c e ,j prefers to follow his
signal. We do not need a tie breaking assumption (as, for instance, Banerjee,
1992). From our condition in (5):
1
2 [αβ + p(1 − α)]α(1 −β)
1
2 [αβ + p(1 − α)]α(1 − β)+1




which is never true. This means that j should always play according to his own
signal. He knows indeed that i could be uninformed whereas he knows he has a
signal and put more weight on it then on i’s choice.
• Finally, the third player (say, z), faces the following possible cases:
— If i and j played the same and he has no signal, then z should follow.
— If i and j played the same and he has a consistent signal, the probability that they
are all right is certainly higher then 1
2. Then he still should follow (or, equivalently,
play his signal).
— If i and j played the same and he has a diﬀerent signal, then z may herd. This
is the new result of the subsection, which is a direct consequence of introducing
noisiness of the signal. Suppose both i and j play “yes” but z has an L signal,
indicating “no” as the correct choice. Recalling that i plays “yes” with probability
p when uninformed, we have from (5):
1
2 [αβ +p(1 − α)][αβ +1− α]α(1 − β)
1
2 [αβ + p(1 − α)][αβ +1− α]α(1 − β)+1




in which it is important to note that, if uninformed, j always follows i. The condi-






β(1 − β)( 6 )
So, according to diﬀerent values of p, herding may arise or not. Graph 2 presents a





β(1−β): lighter colors represent higher values
31of the function, and the black area its minimum.
Graph 2: Herding condition for z







O nt h eh o r i z o n t a la x i sw eh a v eα and on the vertical β. When α is very low
(α ≤ 1
2), it is very unlikely that i and j observed a signal: for any probability p, z
trusts his signal and does not herd. When α grows, it’s the term β which makes
the diﬀerence. The higher β, the lower p which sustains herding: z has stronger
conﬁdence in his own signal. Finally, when α =1 , herding is a straightforward
conclusion for any β and p18.
— If i and j played the opposite, this means that j was informed. If z is uninformed,
then he should follow j, as β ≥ 1
2. If z has a consistent signal, then he should follow.
Finally, if his signal his in line with i’s choice, then he plays his signal. Again, this
last result is obtained through Bayes’ rule. The intuition is simply that z’s signal
is slightly reinforced by the possibility that i is informed as well and that j ss i g n a l
is wrong. To prove this, we start by deﬁning the following events:
Y : the true state is “Yes”;
W : the ﬁst player voted “No”, the second “Yes”
a n dt h ec u r r e n tp l a y e rh a sa“ N o ”s i g n a l .
Then, the herding condition requires:
Pr[Y | W] >
1
2






β(1 − β) and it is obtained with a simple modiﬁcation of the condition in (5).
32that is:
1
2 [α(1 − β)+( 1− p)(1 − α)]α2β(1 − β)
1
2 [α(1 − β)+( 1− p)(1 − α)]α2β(1 − β)+1




which is never true.
8.4 Full information aggregation
We can imagine this situation as one where a single player (the decision maker)c o l l e c t sa l l
the available information by the others and then takes a decision. It is straightforward to
understand that the correct decision is always taken when at least one of the members has a
s i g n a l ,a st h i si sa l w a y sc o r r e c t . W h e nn o b o d yi si n f o r m e d ,t h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rv o t e s“ y e s ”
with a probability p ∈ [0,1], which is optimal, given the priors about the true state of the
world.
The expected value of the election when the actual value is 1 is given by:
E(vm|vm =1 ) = 1 [ Y (p,q,r|vm =1 ) ]+0[ 1− Y (p,q,r|vm =1 ) ]
= Y (p,q,r|vm =1 )=α3 +3 α2(1 − α)+3 α(1 − α)2 + p(1 − α)
3
The expected value when the actual value is −1i sg i v e nb y :
E(vm|vm = −1) = −1[Y (p,q,r|vm = −1)] + 0[1 − Y (p,q,r|vm = −1)]
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